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Abstract. We propose new constructions for identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) and fuzzy
identity-based encryption (FIBE) in bilinear groups of composite order. Our starting point is the IBBE
scheme of Delerablée (Asiacrypt 2007) and the FIBE scheme of Herranz et al. (PKC 2010) proven secure
under parameterised assumptions called generalised decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GDDHE) and
augmented multi-sequence of exponents Diffie-Hellman (aMSE-DDH) respectively. The two schemes are
described in the prime-order pairing group. We transform the schemes into the setting of (symmetric)
composite-order groups and prove security from two static assumptions (subgroup decision).
The Déjà Q framework of Chase et al. (Asiacrypt 2016) is known to cover a large class of parame-
terised assumptions (dubbed über assumption), that is, these assumptions, when defined in asymmetric
composite-order groups, are implied by subgroup decision assumptions in the underlying composite-
order groups. We argue that the GDDHE and aMSE-DDH assumptions are not covered by the Déjà
Q über assumption framework. We therefore work out direct security reductions for the two schemes
based on subgroup decision assumptions. Furthermore, our proofs involve novel extensions of Déjà Q
techniques of Wee (TCC 2016-A) and Chase et al.
Our constructions have constant-size ciphertexts. The IBBE has constant-size keys as well and guaran-
tees stronger security as compared to Delerablée’s IBBE, thus making it the first compact IBBE known
to be selectively secure without random oracles under simple assumptions. The fuzzy IBE scheme is
the first to simultaneously feature constant-size ciphertexts and security under standard assumptions.
Keywords. Identity-based broadcast encryption, fuzzy IBE, space efficiency, simple assumptions.
1 Introduction
Identity-based encryption (IBE) [56] is a public-key paradigm where users’ private keys are gener-
ated by trusted authorities and derived from some easy-to-remember string (like an email address)
that serves as a public key so as to simplify key management. Attribute-based encryption (ABE)
[55, 36] is a powerful extension of IBE where ciphertexts are labeled with a set of descriptive at-
tributes (e.g., “hiring committee”, “admin”, . . . ) in such a way that decryption works whenever
these attributes satisfy an access policy which is hard-coded in the decryption key.
Functional encryption (FE) [55, 16] is an extreme generalization of IBE, where a master private
key SK allows deriving sub-keys SKF associated with functions F . Given an encryption C of a
message X, a sub-key SKF allows computing F (X) while revealing nothing else about X. The
message X = (ind,M) usually consists of an index ind, which is essentially a set of attributes, and
a message M , which is sometimes called “payload”. While the latter is always computationally
hidden, the index ind of a ciphertext may be public or private. Not surprisingly, schemes in the
public index setting tend to be significantly more efficient in terms of ciphertext and key sizes.
In the private-index setting, anonymous IBE [11, 18] is an example of functional encryption for
the equality testing functionality. In the public [55, 36] and private-index [40] cases, ABE can be
cast as another particular flavour of FE, where private keys are associated with expressive access
policies. These primitives provide fine-grained access control [55] or privacy-preserving searches
over encrypted data [11, 1]. In its key-policy (KP-ABE) flavour, ABE involves private keys asso-
ciated with a possibly complex Boolean expression F and, if the ciphertext encrypts the message
X = (ind,M), the private key SKF reveals M if and only if F (ind) = 1. Ciphertext-policy ABE
(CP-ABE) schemes proceed the other way around: ciphertexts are labeled with a policy F ; private
keys are associated with an attribute set ind and decryption succeeds whenever F (ind) = 1.
The usual “collusion-resistance” requirement captures the intuition that no collection of pri-
vate keys should make it possible to decrypt a ciphertext that none of these keys can individually
decrypt. While properly defining the security of FE turns out to be non-trivial [16], the literature
usually distinguishes selective adversaries [19] – that have to declare the index of the challenge ci-
phertext ind? upfront (even before seeing the master public key) – from adaptive adversaries, which
can choose ind? after having made a number of private key queries for functions of their choice.
In terms of expressiveness, a major challenge is certainly to efficiently evaluate any polynomial-
time-computable function F over encrypted data. While theoretical solutions achieve this goal using
the obfuscation machinery [33], practical instantiations of functional encryption are only known for
very restricted classes of functions (such as IBE [12, 59] or ABE [40]) for the time being.
Even for particular functionalities and selective adversaries, proving security is challenging when
we seek to optimise the size of ciphertexts and keys. For example, squeezing many attributes in the
same ciphertext component often comes at the price of larger private keys [6, 4] or security proofs
under fancy q-type assumptions [10, 14] (or both). Likewise, short private keys and public param-
eters [41, 52] often entail strong, variable-size assumptions. Eventualy, constant-size ciphertexts or
keys (“constant” meaning that it only depends on the security parameter and not on the number of
adversarial queries or features of the system) often translate into non-constant-size assumptions. In
some situations, information theoretic arguments [32] even rule out the possibility of simultaneously
achieving constant-size ciphertexts and keys, no matter which assumption is considered.
Here, we restrict ourselves to specific functionalities for which we are interested in proving the
security of compact schemes under well-studied, constant-size assumptions. By “compact”, we mean
that ciphertexts can be comprised of a constant number of group elements – no matter how many
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attributes or users are associated with them – without inflating the private key size. In particu-
lar, private keys should be no longer than in realisations of the same functionality without short
ciphertexts. Finally, we aim at avoiding the caveat of relying on variable-size, q-type assumptions,
which should notoriously be used with caution [25].
We achieve this goal for two natural extensions of IBE, which are known as identity-based
broadcast encryption (IBBE) [2, 53] and fuzzy identity-based encryption (FIBE) [55]. In the former,
ciphertexts are encrypted for a list of identities. The latter is an ABE for policies consisting of a
single threshold gate: i.e., ciphertexts and private keys both correspond to a set of attributes and
decryption succeeds whenever the two sets have a sufficiently large intersection. In fact, IBBE and
FIBE can both be seen as special cases of CP-ABE for policies consisting of a single gate: an IBBE
is nothing but a CP-ABE for one OR gate, which is implied by FIBE for 1-out-of-n gates. However,
considering the two primitives separately allows obtaining shorter private keys in the IBBE case.
1.1 Our Contribution
We describe the first IBBE system with a security proof under constant-size assumptions and that
simultaneously features constant-size ciphertexts and private keys. In our scheme, only the size of
public parameters depends on the maximal number n of receivers per ciphertext. Users’ private
keys only consist of a single(!) group element while ciphertexts are only longer than plaintexts by
2 elements of a composite-order group. We prove selective security in the standard model under
subgroup assumptions [43] in bilinear groups of order N = p1p2p3. In comparison, all earlier IBBE
realisations with short ciphertexts either incur O(n)-size private keys [2, 15, 5, 48] or combine the
random oracle model [8] with very ad hoc assumptions [53, 27] tailored to the result to be proved.
As a second contribution, we extend our IBBE scheme into a fuzzy IBE system with O(1)-
size ciphertexts and private keys made of O(`) group elements, where ` is the maximal number of
attributes per identity. Our FIBE scheme thus asymptotically achieves the same private key size as
[55] with the benefit of constant-size ciphertexts, regardless of the number of ciphertext attributes.
In contrast, except [37], previously known KP-ABE systems with short ciphertexts either inflate
private keys by a factor O(`) [6, 48, 7, 50] or are restricted to small attribute universes [38].
While our constructions rely on composite order groups where pairings are rather expensive to
compute [31], they only require two pairing evaluations on behalf of the receiver (and no pairing on
the sender’s side). Our schemes are proved selectively secure using the Déjà Q technique of Chase
and Meiklejohn [23], which was re-used by Wee [63] and refined by Chase et al. [24]. In Appendix A,
we provide detailed comparisons of our schemes with previously known realizations.
1.2 Overview of our Techniques
Our identity-based broadcast encryption scheme is obtained by instantiating (a variant of) Deler-
ablée’s IBBE [27] in composite order groups and providing a direct security proof, analogously to
Wee’s IBE [63]. In prime order groups, Delerablée’s construction [27] is proved selectively secure in
the random oracle model under a highly non-standard q-type assumption, where q simultaneously
depends on the number of private key queries and the maximal number of receivers per ciphertext.
While this assumption is a special case of the Uber assumption of Boneh, Boyen and Goh [10],
it seems to escape the family of assumptions that reduce the constant-size subgroup assumptions
via the framework of Chase, Maller and Meiklejohn [24]: in Section 3.1, we indeed explain why the
results of [24] alone do not immediately guarantee the security of Delerablée’s IBBE in composite
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order groups.4 Moreover, even if they did, a direct instantiation of [27] in composite order groups
would only be guaranteed to be secure in the random oracle model.5 In contrast, we give a direct
proof of selective security in the standard model.
Just like [27, 63], our scheme uses the private key generation technique of the Sakai-Kasahara
IBE [54], which computes inversions in the exponent. Letting G be a group of order N = p1p2p3
with subgroups of order pi for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, if gγ ∈ Gp1 and Gi = g(α
i) ∈ Gp1 are part of
the public parameters, a private key for the identity id consists of SKid = u
γ/(α+id) · Xp3 , where
u ∈ Gp1 belongs to the master secret key and Xp3 ∈R Gp3 . If S = {id1, . . . , id`} denotes the set of
authorised receivers, one of the ciphertext components packs their identities into one group element
gs·
∏
i∈S(α+id), which can be seen as a randomised version of Nguyen’s accumulator [46]. As shown
in [27], by introducing gγ·s in the ciphertext and blinding the message as M ⊕H(e(g, u)γ·s), we can
enable decryption by exploiting the divisibility properties of the polynomial pS(α) =
∏
i∈S(α+ id),
analogously to [46]. Like the security proof of Wee’s IBE [63], our proof proceeds by first intro-
ducing Gp2 components in ciphertexts. Then, following the technique of [23], it uses the entropy
of α, γ mod p2 – which are information theoretically hidden by g
γ and Gi = g
(αi) – to gradually
introduce Gp2 components of the form g
∑k
j=1 γ̃·rj ·pS(αj)/(αj+id)
2 , where {rj}kj=1 are shared by all pri-
vate keys. At each step, we can increase the number of terms in the exponent so that, when k is
sufficiently large, all keys SKid have independent random components of order p2. At this point, an
information theoretic argument shows that the ciphertext statistically hides the plaintext.
The crucial step of the proof consists of arguing that the newly introduced term in the sum∑k
j=1 rj · pS(αj)/(αj + id) is statistically independent of the public parameters. At this step, our
information theoretic argument differs from Wee’s [63] because, in our IBBE system, public param-
eters contain additional group elements of the form Ui = u
αi · R3,i, which inherit Gp2 components
that depend on
∑k
j=1 rj · αij mod p2, for the same coefficients rj ∈ Zp2 as those showing up in
private keys. Since private keys and public key components {Ui}ni=1 have correlated semi-functional
components6 that share the same {rj mod p2}kj=1, we have to consistently maintain this correla-
tion at all steps of the sequence of game and argue that, when we reach the final game, the Gp2
components of SKid1 , . . . ,SKidq and {Ui}ni=1 are uncorrelated in the adversary’s view. In Wee’s con-






invertible. Here, we are presented with more complex square matrices that involve the two kinds of
entries and also depend on the polynomial pS?(α) =
∏
id∈S?(α+ id), where S
? is the set of the target






where idj denotes the j-th private key query. We use the property that the overall square matrices
are invertible over Zp2 as long as none of the first-degree (α+ idj) divides pS?(α) (i.e., idj 6∈ S? for
all private key queries idj). When this is the case, we are guaranteed that the Gp2 components of
ciphertexts, private keys and public parameters are i.i.d. in the adversary’s view.
Our fuzzy IBE construction is an adaptation of the system described by Herranz, Laguillaumie
and Ràfols [37, 4] in prime order groups, which is itself inspired by the dynamic threshold encryption
4 We believe our arguments showing that the assumptions under question are not covered by the Déjà Q framework
are sufficient. Also, we do not know if there exist other parameterised assumptions in this class that could possibly
be used to prove security of the IBBE and FIBE schemes.
5 Alternatively, the scheme of [27] can be proved secure in the standard model if the adversary also announces all
its private keys queries (in addition to the target set of identities) before seeing the public parameters.
6 The proof of Wee’s broadcast encryption [63, Section 4] has a similar correlation between the Gp2 components
of private keys and public parameters but, in the final step, the statistical argument involved simpler-to-analyse
Vandermonde matrices.
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primitive of Delerablée and Pointcheval [28] and relies on a similarly strong assumption. The FIBE
system of [37] modifies [27, 28] by randomizing the generation of private keys. In our construction,












, K0 = u · u0 ·X3,0,
where u ∈R Gp1 and X3,i ∈R Gp3 are freshly chosen for each key and u0 ∈ Gp1 is a master
secret key component which is committed via e(g, u0)
γ in the master public key. Intuitively, the
public parameters uα
i
0 · R3,i of Delerablée’s IBBE are now replaced by similar-looking private key
components K ′i = u
αi ·X ′3,i for random u ∈R G1 that are used in K0 to blind the master secret key
u0 (collusion-resistance is ensured by the fact that distinct keys involve fresh randomizers u).
Due to the strong structural similarity, the proof for the selective security of our fuzzy IBE can
be viewed as an extension of that for our IBBE system. From the viewpoint of reduction, the fresh
u ∈ Gp1 in each secret key allows us to correspond each secret key to a fresh IBBE instance and
analyse them in an independent fashion. In particular, by considering Ki as SKidi and K
′
i as Ui,
we can apply the proof method of our IBBE to introduce independent random Gp2 component in
all these components and K0 (with u0 ·X3,0). As discussed earlier, the core step is again to argue
the invertibility of a matrix of some special form for each secret key. Although the matrices we
are considering now look like those for the IBBE system, the situation is actually more complex.






? is the set for the target fuzzy identity, (di)i is a
set of dummy identities and δ depends on the target threshold τ∗. Unlike the IBBE case, there can
be an idj ∈ {id1, . . . , id`} such that idj ∈ S? so that (α + idj) divides pS?,τ?(α) in the FIBE case.
This prevents us from directly applying our previous result on the matrices. Instead, we will prove
the property that these matrices are still invertible as long as the number of such idj do not exceed
the target threshold τ∗. Inspired by the recent proof for IBE in the multi-instance setting [20], we
can in fact change the distributions of all secret keys independently but simultaneously using the
random self-reducibility of decisional subgroup assumptions. Once we have independent random
Gp2 component in K0 in each secret key, we then introduce semi-functional component (in Gp2) for
the master secret key component u0 and show that it will be hidden by the random Gp2 component
in K0. This means the semi-functional component of u0 will only appear in the challenge ciphertext
which is adequate for proving the selective security of our fuzzy IBE system.
1.3 Related Work
Broadcast encryption was introduced by Fiat and Naor [30] and comes either in combinatorial
[44] or algebraic flavors [45, 14, 34, 60, 41]. One of the most appealing tradeoffs was given in the
scheme of Boneh, Gentry and Waters [14], which features short ciphertexts and private keys but
linear-size private keys in the total number of users. While its security was initially proved under
a parameterised assumption, recent extensions [63, 24] of the Déjà Q framework [23] showed how
to prove the security (against static adversaries) of its composite-order-group instantiations under
constant-size subgroup assumptions. Boneh et al. suggested a variant [17] of the BGW scheme [14]
with polylogarithmic complexity in all metrics using multi-linear maps. Unfortunately, the current
status of multi-linear maps does not enable secure instantiations of [17] for now (see, e.g., [26]).
Identity-based broadcast encryption was formally defined by Abdalla, Kiltz and Neven [2] and
independently considered by Sakai and Furukawa [53]. One of the salient advantages of IBBE over
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traditional public-key broadcast encryption is the possibility of accommodating an exponential
number of users with polynomial-size public parameters. IBBE was recently used [29] in the design
of efficient 0-RTT key exchange protocols with forward secrecy. Abdalla et al. [2] gave a generic
construction with short ciphertexts and private keys of size O(n2), where n is the maximal number
of receivers. Sakai and Furukawa [53] suggested a similar construction to [27] with security proofs
in the generic group and random oracle model. Boneh and Hamburg [15] obtained a system with
O(1)-size ciphertexts and O(n)-size keys. Using the Déja Q technique, Chen et al. [21] described an
identity-based revocation mechanism [41] with short ciphertexts and private keys under constant-
size assumptions. The aforementioned constructions were all only proven secure against selective
adversaries. Gentry and Waters [34] put forth an adaptively secure construction based on q-type
assumptions while Attrapadung and Libert [5] showed a fully secure variant of [15] under simple
assumptions. To our knowledge, the only IBBE realisations that simultaneously feature constant-
size ciphertexts and private keys are those of [27, 53], which require highly non-standard assumptions
and the random oracle model. As mentioned by Derler et al. [29], the short ciphertexts and private
keys of Delerablée’s scheme [27] make it interesting to instantiate their generic construction of
Bloom Filter Encryption, which in turn implies efficient 0-RTT key exchange protocols. Until this
work, even for selective adversaries, it has been an open problem to simultaneously achieve short
ciphertext and private keys without resorting to variable-size assumptions.
Attribute-based encryption was first considered in the seminal paper by Sahai and Waters [55].
Their fuzzy IBE primitive was later extended by Goyal et al. [36] into more expressive forms of
ABE, where decryption is possible when the attribute set of the ciphertext satisfies a more complex
Boolean formula encoded in the private key. After 2006, a large body of work was devoted to the
design of adaptively secure [42, 47–49, 7, 50, 58] and more expressive ABE systems [51, 41, 61, 62, 35,
13]. In contrast, little progress has been made in the design of ABE schemes with short ciphertexts.
The first reasonably expressive ABE systems with constant-size ciphertexts were given in [37, 6, 4]
under q-type assumptions. The solution of Herranz et al. [37] is a fuzzy IBE (i.e., a CP-ABE system
for one threshold gate) with private keys of size O(n) where n is the maximal number of attributes
per ciphertext. The more expressive KP-ABE systems of [6, 4] support arbitrary Boolean formulas,
but enlarge the private keys of [36] by a factor n. The construction of [38, Section 3.4] eliminates
the upper bound on the number of ciphertext attributes, but lengthens private keys by a factor
|U |, where U is the universe of attributes. Several follow-up works improved upon [6] by proving
security under simple assumptions [22, 57] or achieving full security [7]. However, all known KP-
ABE schemes with short ciphertexts under simple assumptions suffer from similarly large private
keys. While our scheme only supports one threshold gate, it turns out to be the first solution with
short ciphertexts under simple assumptions that avoids blowing up private keys by a factor O(n).
2 Preliminaries
Notation. We write x1, . . . , xk
R←− X to indicate that x1, . . . , xk are sampled independently and
uniformly from the set X . For a PPT algorithm A, y R←− A(x) means that y is chosen according to
the output distribution of A on input x. For integers a < b, [a, b] denotes the set {x ∈ Z : a ≤ x ≤ b}
and we let [b] = [1, b]. If G is a cyclic group, G× denotes the set of generators of G.
2.1 Composite-Order Pairings and Hardness Assumptions
A (symmetric) composite-order pairing ensemble generator GroupGen() is an algorithm that inputs
a security parameter η and an integer m and returns an (m + 3)-tuple G = (p1, . . . , pm,G,GT , e)
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where G and GT are cyclic groups of order N = p1 · · · pm (a square-free, hard-to-factor integer)
and e : G × G → GT is a non-degenerate and efficiently computable bilinear map. The primes
are chosen so that pi > 2
η for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We will use hardness assumptions which require
the factorisation of N to remain hidden. Given G = (p1, . . . , pm,G,GT , e), let Gpub = (N,G,GT , e)
denote the public description of G where N = p1 · · · pm and we assume that G,GT contain respective
generators (of the full groups). Letting Gpi be the subgroup of order pi of G, we denote elements
of Gpi with subscript i for i ∈ [m]. We now describe decisional subgroup (DS) assumptions w.r.t.
(G = (p1, p2, p3,G,GT , e)) ←− GroupGen(η, 3), which is stated in terms of two distributions: D, T1
and D, T2. We define AdvBG,DS(η) = |Pr[B(D, T1) = 1] − Pr[B(D, T2) = 1]| to be the advantage of
a distinguisher B against DS. We now describe D, T1, T2 for the assumptions we use.
Assumption DS1. Pick generators g1
R←− G×p1 and g3
R←− G×p3 . Define D = (Gpub, g1, g3), T1
R←−
Gp1 and T2
R←− Gp1p2 . DS1 holds if for all PPT B, AdvBG,DS1(η) is negligible in η.
Assumption DS2. Pick g1
R←− G×p1 , g3
R←− G×p3 , h12
R←− Gp1p2 and h23
R←− Gp2p3 . Define
D = (Gpub, g1, g3, h12, h23), T1
R←− Gp1p3 and T2
R←− Gp1p2p3 . The DS2 assumption holds if for all
PPT B, AdvBG,DS2(η) is negligible in η.
2.2 Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption (IBBE)
Definition 1 (IBBE). An IBBE scheme is defined by probabilistic algorithms Setup, KeyGen,
Encrypt and Decrypt. The identity space is denoted by I and the message space is denoted by M.
Setup(1λ, 1n): Takes as input a security parameter λ, the maximum number n (= poly(λ)) of
recipient identities in a broadcast and generates the public parameters PP and the master secret
MSK. The algorithm also defines the identity space I and message space M.
KeyGen(MSK, id): Inputs an identity id and MSK; outputs a key SKid for id.
Encrypt(PP, S ⊆ I,m ∈M): Takes as input the public parameters and a set of identities S intended
to receive the message m. If |S| ≤ n, the algorithm outputs the ciphertext CT.
Decrypt(PP, S,CT, id,SKid): Inputs PP, a set S = {id1, . . . , id`}, an identity id, a secret key SKid
for id, a ciphertext CT and outputs a message m′ ∈M if id ∈ S and otherwise outputs ⊥.
Correctness. The IBBE scheme satisfies correctness if, for all sets S ⊆ I with |S| ≤ n, for all iden-
tities idi ∈ S, for all messages m ∈M, if (PP,MSK)
R←− Setup(1λ, 1n), SKidi
R←− KeyGen(MSK, idi)
and CT
R←− Encrypt(PP, S,m), then we have Pr[m = Decrypt(PP, S,CT, idi,SKidi)] = 1.
Definition 2 (IBBE Security). An IBBE system IBBE = (Setup,KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) pro-
vides selective security if no PPT adversary A has non-negligible advantage in the following game.
Initialise: A commits to a target set of identities S∗ = {id∗1, . . . , id∗`∗}.
Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm of IBBE and gives PP to A .
Key Extraction Phase 1: A makes key extraction queries. For a query on an identity vector id
such that id /∈ S∗, the challenger runs IBBE .KeyGen algorithm and responds with a key SKid.
Challenge: A provides two messages m0,m1. The challenger chooses a bit β uniformly at random
from {0, 1}, computes CT∗ R←− IBBE .Encrypt(PP, S∗,mβ) and returns CT∗ to A .
Key Extraction Phase 2: A makes more key extraction queries with the restriction that it cannot
query a key for any identity in S∗.
Guess: A outputs a bit β′. If β = β′, then A wins the game. The adversary A ’s advantage is
given by the distance AdvAIBBE ,sid-cpa(λ) = |Pr[β = β′]− 1/2|.
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2.3 Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption (FIBE)
Definition 3 (FIBE). A fuzzy IBE scheme is defined by probabilistic algorithms – Setup, KeyGen,
Encrypt and Decrypt. The identity space is denoted by I and the message space is denoted by M.
Setup(1λ, 1n): Takes as input a security parameter λ, the maximum size n (= poly(λ)) of sets
associated with ciphertexts and generates the public parameters PP and the master secret MSK.
The algorithm also defines the identity space I and message space M.
KeyGen(MSK, S ⊆ I): Inputs a set S and MSK; outputs a secret key SKS for S.
Encrypt(PP, S ⊆ I, τ,m ∈M): Takes as input the public parameters PP, a set of identities S along
with a threshold τ and a message m. If τ ≤ |S| ≤ n, the algorithm outputs the ciphertext CTS,τ .
Decrypt(PP, S, τ,CTS,τ , S
′,SKS′): This algorithm inputs the public parameters PP, a set S ⊆ I
with a threshold τ and a ciphertext CTS,τ associated with them, another set S
′ ⊆ I and its
corresponding secret key SKS′, outputs a message m
′ ∈M if |S ∩ S′| ≥ τ and ⊥ otherwise.
Correctness. The FIBE scheme is correct if, for all sets S ⊆ I, all thresholds τ ≤ |S| ≤ n, all S′ ∈ I
satisfying |S ∩ S′| ≥ τ , all m ∈M, when (PP,MSK) R←− Setup(1λ, 1n), SKS′
R←− KeyGen(MSK, S′)
and CTS,τ
R←− Encrypt(PP, S, τ,m), then Pr[m = Decrypt(PP, S, τ,CTS,τ , S′,SKS′)] = 1.
Definition 4 (FIBE Security). A FIBE system FIBE = (Setup,KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) pro-
vides selective security if no PPT adversary A has non-negligible advantage in the following game.
Initialise: A commits to a target set S∗ ⊆ I and threshold τ∗ satisfying τ∗ ≤ |S∗| ≤ n.
Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm of FIBE and gives PP to A .
Key Extraction Phase 1: A makes a number of key extraction queries. For a query on S ⊆ I
such that |S∗ ∩ S| < τ∗, the challenger runs SKS ← FIBE .KeyGen and otuputs SKS.
Challenge: A provides two messages m0,m1. The challenger chooses β
R←− {0, 1}, computes
CT∗
R←− FIBE .Encrypt(PP, S∗, τ∗,mβ) and returns CT∗ to A .
Key Extraction Phase 2: A makes more key extraction queries with the restriction that it cannot
query a key for any set S such that |S∗ ∩ S| ≥ τ∗.
Guess: A outputs a bit β′. We say A wins the game if β = β′. The advantage of A in winning
the sid-cpa game is defined to be AdvAFIBE ,sid-cpa(λ) = |Pr[β = β′]− 1/2|.
3 Compact IBBE from Subgroup Decision Assumptions
This section describes our IBBE scheme with short ciphertexts and keys. The structure is similar
to Delerablée’s IBBE [27] in asymmetric prime-order groups.
3.1 Déjà Q Framework and its implications on Delerablée’s IBBE
The scheme proposed by Delerablée in [27] is based on prime-order asymmetric pairings and offers
constant-size ciphertexts and keys. However, its proof of security relies on random oracles and a
parameterised assumption called generalised decisional Diffie-Hellman exponent (GDDHE) with
instances containing O(q + n) group elements. A scheme/proof without random oracles is also
suggested but at the cost of an interactive GDDHE-like assumption and a more restrictive security
definition (called IND-na-sID-CPA) in which the adversary has to commit to the identities for key
extract queries during the initialisation phase (in addition to the challenge identity set).
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It is natural to ask whether the scheme can be lifted to the composite-order setting and proved
secure based on subgroup decision assumptions via the Déjà Q framework [23, 24]. That is, we ask
whether the Uber assumption in asymmetric composite-order bilinear groups defined in [24] covers
the GDDHE assumption or not? The answer is negative. To see why, let us take a closer look at the
Uber assumption of [24] and the (asymmetric) GDDHE-assumption. For clarity, we avoid formal
descriptions of assumptions and other details.
Uber assumption [24]. Assume G = (N, p1, p2, p3,G1,G2,GT , e) be an asymmetric composite-
order pairing group. Let R(x), S(x), V (x) denote sets of polynomials in n variables x = (x1, . . . , xn)
and let z(x) be a polynomial in x. Let g be a generator of G1 and h, ĥ be two independent generators
of G2. The uber assumption states that given
g, ĥ, gR(x), hS(x), e(g, h)V (x), T
it is hard to decide if T = e(g, ĥ)z(x) or T ∈R GT . It known [24] that the uber assumption is implied
by constant-size subgroup decision assumptions in G1 and G2 if R(x), z(x) are linearly independent
along other requirements (see [24, Proposition 3.9] for formal statement).
In order to simplify our analysis, we may let ĥδ = h for an independent exponent δ
R←− ZN and
re-state the uber assumption as: given
g, ĥ, gR(x), ĥδ·S(x), e(g, ĥ)δ·V (x), T
it is hard to decide if T = e(g, ĥ)z(x) or T ∈R GT . Here, δ · S(x) = {δ · s(x) : s ∈ S(x)} and
δ · V (x) = {δ · v(x) : v ∈ V (x)}. We highlight that the Déjà Q framework in [24] requires the
polynomials in the exponents of ĥ to be in the form of δ · poly(x) with an independent δ.
Déjà Q framework does not cover GDDHE assumption [27]. Let an asymmetric prime-
order pairing configuration G = (p,G1,G2,GT , e). Let g0, h0 be the respective generators of G1,G2.
Pick k, γ
R←− Zp and let f, g be two co-prime polynomials with pairwise distinct roots of respective




















along with T ∈ GT , it is hard to determine whether T = e(g0, h0)kf(γ) or T ∈R GT .
As a direct attempt to put GDDHE into the Déjà Q framework, we can let g = g0 and ĥ = h0.
This means we are considering x = (γ, k) and
z(γ, k) = kf(γ), V = ∅, R(γ, k) = {1, γ, γ2, . . . , γq−1, γf(γ), kγf(γ)}.
In this case, polynomials in the exponents of ĥ include {1, γ, γ2, . . . , γ2n, kg(γ).} Since both γ and
k has appeared in z(x) and R(x), there’s no means to write these polynomials in the form of
δ · poly(x) with an independent variable δ.
With our current choice of g, all polynomials in the exponents of g fit the Déjà Q framework
quite well. To get around this problem, we try another definition of ĥ. The best choice can be
setting ĥ = hk0, x = γ and z(γ) = f(γ). The basic idea is to set δ = k
−1. However, the polynomials
in the exponents of ĥ become
k−1, k−1 · γ, k−1 · γ2, . . . , k−1 · γ2n, g(γ)
where the last polynomial is still in the wrong form and we can not publish ĥ itself this time.
Even worse, δ will also appear in the exponent of g = g0 since the input to the adversary contains
gkγf(γ) (in the original assumption) which will become gδ
−1γf(γ) in the current setting. We can
make this argument more general. If we want to borrow δ from kf(γ), which seems to be the
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unique random source we can use in the challenge, it will finally appear (in some form) in the term
gkγf(γ). Therefore, the Déjà Q transform fails.
In this forthcoming sections, instead of trying to reduce subgroup decision to the GDDHE,
we give direct security reductions (via Déjà Q techniques) for constructions in composite-order
groups (similar to [27]) from subgroup decision assumptions. Our construction has constant-size
ciphertexts and keys and is selectively secure under the static subgroup decision assumptions, thus
achieving a stronger security guarantee as compared to [27].
3.2 Construction
We now describe the construction IBBE = (Setup,KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt).
Setup(1λ, 1n): Let M = {0, 1}ρ where ρ ∈ poly(λ). Generate a composite-order pairing ensemble
(G = (p1, p2, p3,G,GT , e))←− GroupGen(ρ+ 2λ, 3). Set N = p1p2p3 and I = ZN . Pick genera-
tors g, u
R←− Gp1 and g3
R←− Gp3 . Sample R3,i
R←− Gp3 for i = [n]. Also, choose α, γ
R←− ZN .
Let H : GT → {0, 1}ρ be a universal hash function with output length ρ. Define the master
secret as MSK = (u, α, γ, g3) while the public parameters consist of
PP =
(
Gpub, g, gγ , (Gi = gα
i
, Ui = u
αi ·R3,i)ni=1, e(g, u)γ , H
)
.
KeyGen(MSK, id): Pick X3
R←− Gp3 and generate the key for identity id as SKid = u
γ
α+id ·X3.






j ∈ ZN [x]. Choose s R← ZN and output
CT =
(















is a polynomial, where z0 =
∏











j ) = e(g
sγ , upS\{id}(α)−z0) = e(g, u)sγ(pS\{id}(α)−z0),
A2 = e(C2,SKid) = e(g
spS(α), u
γ
α+id ·X3) = e(g, u)sγpS\{id}(α).
The correctness of the scheme follows from the divisibility properties of pS(x) and is easy to verify.
3.3 Proof of Security
In the security reduction, we use an additional parameter U0 = u ·R3,0 where R3,0
R←− Gp3 that is
not part of either PP or MSK.
Theorem 1. For any adversary A attacking IBBE in the sid-cpa model making at most q key
extraction queries, there exist algorithms B1,B2 such that
AdvAIBBE ,sid-cpa(λ) ≤ 2 · Adv
B1









Proof. We organise the proof as a sequence of 2(q+ n) + 8 hybrid games. Let E denote the event
that A wins in G. Let id1, . . . , idq denote the identities provided in extract queries.
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Gr: This is the real security game.
G0: This game is like Gr with the following modifications regarding private key queries.
– No two distinct identities id 6= id′ mod N satisfy id ≡ id′ mod p2.
– A does not provide any id such that α+ id ≡ 0 mod p1.
These events can be detected without knowing the factorization of N , by a simple gcd calcula-
tion (indeed, since PP only reveal α mod p1 we can only have α+id ≡ 0 mod N with negligible
probability). If either of these rules is broken, the challenger aborts the game. Assuming that
N is hard to factor, these modifications do not affect A ’s view. Since Assumptions DS1 and
DS2 imply the hardness of factoringN , we have |Pr[Er]−Pr[E0]| ≤ AdvB1G,DS1(λ)+Adv
B2
G,DS2(λ).
G1: This is similar to G0 with the following changes. Let S
∗ = {id∗1, . . . , id∗`∗} be the set of challenge
identities chosen by A . In the setup phase, we pick α, γ̃
R←− ZN and set γ = γ̃ ·pS∗(α) mod N .
The public parameters and challenge ciphertext are generated as in G0 (as the challenger





R←− Gp3 . Since this is only a conceptual change, we have Pr[E0] = Pr[E1].
G2: In this game, the session key is generated using the parameter U0 and the component C
∗
1 of
the challenge ciphertext is sampled at random from Gp1 .
C∗1
R←− Gp1 , C∗2 = C∗1 1/γ̃ , C∗0 = Mβ ⊕ H(e(C∗1 , U0)),
where β
R←− {0, 1} and U0 = u · R3.0 with R3,0
R←− Gp3 . If we write C∗1 = gsγ for some
uniformly random s ∈R Zp1 , then C∗2 is given by (C∗1 )1/γ̃ = gsγ/(γ/pS∗ (α)) = gspS∗ (α) and is
thus well-formed. Also, C∗0 has the correct distribution since
C∗0 = Mβ ⊕ H(e(C∗1 , U0)) = Mβ ⊕ H(e(gsγ , u ·R3,0)) = Mβ ⊕ H(e(g, u)sγ).
The modifications G1 are thus conceptual and hence Pr[E1] = Pr[E2].
G3: This game is identical to G2 except that C
∗
1 is sampled uniformly in Gp1p2 . Other components
of the challenge ciphertext and the secret keys are generated as in G2.
Lemma 1. There is a PPT algorithm B1 such that |Pr[E2]− Pr[E3]| ≤ AdvB1G,DS1(λ).
G4: We change the distribution of parameters {Ui}ni=0 and secret keys SKid1 , . . . ,SKidq by gradually
introducing Gp2 components. This is done via sub-games G4.k.0, G4.k.1 for k ∈ [q+n+1] defined
as follows. For convenience, we define G4.0.1 = G3 and G4.(q+n+2).1 = G4.







2 ·R3,i −→ uα






































The following lemma shows that G4.(k−1).1 and G4.k.0 are computationally indistinguishable.
Lemma 2. There is a PPT algorithm B2 such that |Pr[E4.(k−1).1]−Pr[E4.k.0]| ≤ AdvB2G,DS2(λ).
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In the transition from G4.k.0 to G4.k.1, α and r in the exponent of g2 are replaced by random
αk, rk ∈R Zp2 . This change does not affect A ’s view since none of the other public parameters
or the challenge ciphertext reveal α mod p2. In particular, due to the change introduced in
G2, C
∗
2 is computed using γ̃, which is independent of pS∗(α) mod p2 since PP only reveals γ̃ ·
pS∗(α) mod p1 via g
γ and e(g, u)γ . Hence, by the CRT, we can replace α mod p2 by αk mod p2
without A noticing. As a result, we have Pr[E4.k.0] = Pr[E4.k.1] for each k ∈ [0, n+ q + 2].
G5: We replace the exponents in the Gp2-components of SKid1 , . . . ,SKidq and {Ui}ni=0 by indepen-
dent random elements t0, t1, . . . , tq+n ∈ Zp2 . Namely, (Ui)ni=0 and keys are computed as
Ui = u
αi · gti2 ·R3,i ∀i ∈ [0, n], SKidy = u
γ̃·pS∗ (α)
α+idy · gtn+y2 ·X3,y.
We argue that G5 is statistically close to G4. We consider the Gp2 components of
U0, U1, . . . , Un,SKid1 , . . . ,SKidq . In G4, their logarithms t
′
0, . . . , t
′










1 1 ··· 1




































Since idy /∈ S∗ for all y ∈ [q], the modifications introduced in G0 ensure that none of the
first-degree polynomials (x+ idy) mod p2 divides pS∗(x) ∈ Zp2 [x]. In addition, remainders fy
obtained upon division of pS∗(x) by x + idy are constant-degree non-zero polynomials (i.e.,
non-zero constants in Zp2). Using elementary row and column operations on A, we obtain
that det A = c · det B mod p2, where c = γ̃q · f1f2 · · · fq and
B =

1 1 ··· 1


























Lemma 3 provides an explicit computation of the determinant of B.








for constant δ ∈ Z∗p2.
From Lemma 3 and the distinctness of id1, . . . , idq mod p2 (which is ensured since G0), it is
clear that det B 6= 0 as long as αi 6= αj mod p2 for all i, j ∈ [q + n+ 1], which happens with
probability > 1− (q+n+1)
2
p2
. In this case, we have det(A) 6= 0 mod p2, so that the left-hand-side
member of (1) is uniform over Zn+q+1p2 . Therefore, |Pr[E4]− Pr[E5]| ≤ (q + n+ 1)2/p2.
G6: In this game, challenge ciphertext is generated as
C∗1
R←− Gp1p2 , C∗2 = C∗1 1/γ̃ , C∗0 = Mβ ⊕K
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where K
R←− {0, 1}ρ. In game G5, we note that t0 only appears in C∗0 and it is independent
of (Ui)
n
i=1 and the keys obtained by A . Letting C
∗
1 = g
sγ · gω22 for some ω2 ∈R Zp2 , we have
H(e(C∗1 , U0)) = H(e(g
s·γ , u) · e(gω22 , g
t0
2 )).
Conditionally on A ’s view, e(C∗1 , U0) has log(p2) bits of min-entropy as long as C
∗
1 has a non-
trivial Gp2 component. Since ω2 6= 0 mod p2 with probability 1−1/p2 and H is a universal hash
function, the Leftover Hash Lemma ensures that H(e(C∗1 , U0)) is within distance at most 2
−λ
from the uniform distribution over {0, 1}ρ. This implies that |Pr[E5]−Pr[E6]| ≤ 1/p2 + 1/2λ.
Since β ∈ {0, 1} is perfectly hidden from the adversary in G6, we have Pr[E6] = 1/2.
Combining the above, A ’s advantage can be bounded as AdvAIBBE ,sid-cpa(λ) = |Pr[Er]−Pr[E6]|. ut
4 Fuzzy IBE with Short Ciphertexts
We now present a fuzzy IBE scheme obtained by transposing the prime-order construction of
Herranz et al. [37, 4] to composite order groups. The security of their scheme relies on the augmented
multi-sequence of exponents decisional Diffie-Hellman (aMSE-DDH) assumption. As in Section 3,
we start with an explanation of why this assumption is not covered by the Uber assumption of [24].
Déjà Q framework does not cover aMSE-DDH assumption [37, 4]. Let an asymmetric
prime-order pairing configuration G = (p,G1,G2,GT , e). We describe an asymmetric version of the
(`,m, t)-aMSE-DDH assumption.7 With a length-(`+m) vector y = (y1, . . . , yl+m), define functions
f(Y ) =
∏`
i=1(Y + yi) and g(Y ) =
∏`+m
i=`+1(Y + yi). Let g0, h0 be generators of G1 and G2 and pick
k, γ, α, β
R←− Zp. The (`,m, t)-aMSE-DDH assumption states that given
g0, g
γ




0 , h0, h
γ






















0 , . . . , h
αγ2(m−t)+3
0 ,
and T ∈ GT , it is hard to determine whether T = e(g0, h0)kf(γ) or T ∈R GT .
We observe that the first line of the input is quite similar to the input of the GDDHE as-
sumption [27] (cf. Section 3.1). We can transpose the discussion in Section 3.1 to the aMSE-DDH
assumption. As we have shown, the gap between the uber assumption [24] and the aMSE-DDH
assumption is due to the structures of polynomials in the exponents of h0 and the entry g
kγf(γ)
0
which shares kf(γ) with the challenge. We therefore conclude that the Déjà Q framework [24] does
not subsume the (`,m, t)-aMSE-DDH assumption.
In this section as well, we are not going to start from the aMSE-DDH assumption. Instead, we
will try to adapt Herranz et al.’s prime-order construction [37] into composite-order groups and
analyse its selective security directly. Our fuzzy IBE scheme preserves the advantages of Herranz et
al.’s [37] such as constant-size ciphertexts and can now be proved secure under static assumptions.
4.1 Construction
Before presenting the construction, we first describe the algorithm Aggregate of [28, 4].
7 The assumption is originally given in symmetric groups. In order to work with the Déjà Q framework, one must
transform it into asymmetric groups (using Abe et al.’s method [3] as suggested in [24]) which depends on the
scheme and the reduction.
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Aggregate Algorithm. The Aggregate algorithm of [28] was given for elements in GT , but it
carries over to any prime order group [4]. Our construction requires it to work in composite order
groups. Let a cyclic group G of composite order N . Given a set of pairs {u
1
α+xi , xi}ni=1, where u ∈ G
and α ∈ ZN are unknown and x1, . . . , xn ∈ ZN are pairwise distinct elements such that
gcd(xi − xj , N) = 1 for all i 6= j, (2)
the algorithm computes the value Aggregate({u
1
α+xi , xi}ni=1) = u
1∏n
i=1
(α+xi) using O(n2) exponentia-
tions. (See Appendix C for details.) It is unlikely to encounter a pair (xi, xj) violating restriction (2)
since it exposes a non-trivial factorisation of N and violate the decisional subgroup assumption.
Our Fuzzy IBE Construction. In the description hereunder, we denote by n an upper bound
on the number ` of attributes per identity. The construction goes as follows.
Setup(1λ, 1n): Choose ρ ∈ poly(λ) and defineM = {0, 1}ρ. Generate a composite-order pairing en-
semble (G = (p1, p2, p3,G,GT , e))←− GroupGen(ρ+2λ, 3) and set N = p1p2p3. Then, arbitrarily
select n−1 distinct dummy identities d1, . . . , dn−1 ∈ ZN . Define the set I = ZN \{d1, . . . , dn−1}.
Pick g, u0
R←− Gp1 and g3
R←− Gp3 and choose α, γ
R←− ZN . Let H : GT → {0, 1}ρ be a universal
hash function. Define MSK = (u0, α, γ, g3) while the public parameters consist of
PP =
(












KeyGen(MSK, S = {id1, . . . , id`}): Pick u R← Gp1 , X3,1, . . . , X3,`, X ′3,1, . . . , X ′3,n−1, X3,0
R← Gp3 and














, K0 = u · u0 ·X3,0
)
.
Encrypt(PP, S = {id1, . . . , id`}, τ ≤ `,M): To encrypt M ∈ {0, 1}ρ for the set S with threshold τ ,





i=1 (x+ di) =
∑n+τ−1
i=0 cix
i ∈ ZN [x].
Choose s
R←− ZN and output the ciphertext
CTS,τ =
(











Decrypt(PP, S, τ,CT, S′,SKS′): If |S ∩ S′| < τ , return ⊥. Otherwise, we can find a set S̄ ⊆ I
satisfying S̄ ⊆ S ∩S′ and |S̄| = τ . Note that the choice of S̄ is arbitrary. By invoking algorithm




for some X3,Agg ∈ Gp3 . Let
















zi) = e(gsγ , upS,S̄,τ (α)−z0) = e(g, u)sγ(pS,S̄,τ (α)−z0),
A2 = e(C2,KAgg) = e(g
s·pS,τ (α), u
γ∏
id∈S̄(α+id) ·X3,Agg) = e(g, u)sγpS,S̄,τ (α),
A3 = e(C1,K0) = e(g
sγ , u · u0 ·X3,0) = e(g, u)sγ · e(g, u0)sγ ,







The scheme is easily seen to be correct. We note that Decrypt can be optimized to consume only 2








4.2 Proof of Security
Theorem 2. For any adversary A attacking FIBE in the sid-cpa model making at most q key
extraction queries, there exist algorithms B1,B2 such that
AdvAFIBE ,sid-cpa(λ) ≤ 2 · Adv
B1









where ` is maximum size of attribute sets.
Proof Sketch. Let (S∗ = (id∗1, . . . , id
∗
`∗), τ
∗) be the challenge set and challenge threshold; S1, . . . , Sq
denote the sets provided in extract queries. It is worth noting that each secret key corresponds to
an instance of our IBBE with its own random source u, denoted by u1, . . . , uq for SKS1 , . . . ,SKSq ,
respectively. Following a game sequence analogous to that for IBBE (from Gr to G4), we reach the









, e(gγ , U0) , (di)
n−1
i=1 , H )
where γ = γ̃ · pS∗,τ∗(α) mod N with γ̃ R← ZN and U0 = u0 ·X3.0 with X3,0 R← Gp3 . The challenge is
(C∗1
R←− Gp1p2 , C∗2 = C∗1 1/γ̃ , C∗0 = Mβ ⊕ H(e(C∗1 , U0)) );




























K0,y = uy · g
∑`y+n
j=1 rj,y
2 · U0 ·X3,0,y,
where α, α1, . . . , α`+n
R←− ZN are shared among all keys but r1,y, . . . , r`+n,y
R←− ZN are fresh.
As in the IBBE case, we want to claim that it is a (`y + n)-wise independent function that has
been formed on the exponent of g2 (in the boxed term). For each key, say SKS with S = {id1, . . . , id`}
for simplicity, it must hold that τ = |S ∩ S∗| < τ∗ and we can assume id1 = id∗1, . . . , idτ = id∗τ .


















for α ∈ {α1, . . . , α`+n} has a non-zero determinant with high probability under the restriction
τ < τ∗. This then implies that K0,y in SKSy (y ∈ [q]) will have a non-trivial Gp2 component
independent of all other information, denoted by Ûy.
Finally, we introduce a non-trivial Gp2 component into U0 by the DS2 assumption, and argue
that, conditioned on e(g, U0), U0 · Û1, . . . , U0 · Ûq, the Gp2 component of U0 is still distributed
uniformly. That is e(C∗1 , U0) has min-entropy of log(p2) bits, and the leftover hash lemma ensures
that the information about β will be statistically hidden. See Appendix D for more details. ut
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26. J.-H. Cheon, K. Han, C. Lee, H. Ryu. D. Stehlé. Cryptanalysis of the Multilinear Map over the Integers. In
Eurocrypt’15, LNCS 9056, 2015.
27. C. Delerablée. Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption with Constant Size Ciphertexts and Private Keys. In
Asiacrypt 2007, LNCS 4833, 2007.
15
28. C. Delerablée, D. Pointcheval. Dynamic Threshold Public-Key Encryption. In Crypto 2008, LNCS 5157, 2007.
29. D. Derler, T. Jager, D. Slamanig, C. Striecks. Bloom Filter Encryption and Applications to Efficient Forward-
Secret 0-RTT Key Exchange. In Eurocrypt 2018, LNCS 10822, 2018.
30. A. Fiat, M. Naor. Broadcast Encryption. In Crypto’93, LNCS 773, 1993.
31. D. Freeman. Converting Pairing-Based Cryptosystems from Composite-Order Groups to Prime-Order Groups.
In Eurocrypt’10, LNCS 6110, 2010.
32. R. Gay, I. Kerenidis, H. Wee. Communication Complexity of Conditional Disclosure of Secrets and Attribute-
Based Encryption. In Crypto’15, LNCS 9216, 2015.
33. S. Garg, C. Gentry, S. Halevi, M. Raykova, A. Sahai, B. Waters. Candidate Indistinguishability Obfuscation and
Functional Encryption for all Circuits. FOCS 2013, 2013
34. C. Gentry, B. Waters. Adaptive Security in Broadcast Encryption Systems (with Short Ciphertexts). In Euro-
crypt’09, LNCS 5479, 2009.
35. S. Gorbunov, V. Vaikuntanathan, H. Wee. Attribute-Based Encryption for Circuits from LWE. In STOC 2013,
2013.
36. V. Goyal, O. Pandey, A. Sahai, B. Waters. Attribute-based encryption for fine-grained access control of encrypted
data. In ACM CCS’06, 2006.
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A Comparisons with Prior Works
We give detailed comparisons between our two schemes and earlier realizations along with more
discussions.
Table 1 provides a detailed comparison between our IBBE system and other IBBE with short
ciphertexts and secret keys. Table 2 compares our FIBE with previous FIBE with short ciphertexts.
We fix the following notation: CT: ciphertext; SKid: secret key for identity id; #dec: cost of decryp-
tion; ρ is the length of the message to be encrypted; GN : symmetric pairing group with order N (a
composite number); G1, G2: source groups of an asymmetric prime-order pairing of order p, a prime;
[P]: a pairing operation; [M]: scalar multiplication in the source groups; aID: adaptive/full security;
sID: security selective identity model; na-sID: security in the selective model with non-adaptive
key extraction queries; saID: security in semi-adaptive model; GDDHE: generalised decision Diffie-
Hellman exponent assumption; O-GDDHE: an oracle variant of GDDHE; GGM: proven secure in
the generic (bilinear) group model; aMSE-DDH: augmented multi-sequence of exponents decisional
Diffie-Hellman assumption; Static: standard assumption in composite-order pairing group, such as
subgroup decision assumption and subgroup Diffie-Hellman assumption.
IBBE |CT| |SKid| #dec Security Assumption RO
[27]-1 |G1| + |G2| + ρ |G1| 2[P]+O(n)[M] sID GDDHE Yes
[27]-28 |G1| + |G2| + ρ |G1| + |Zp| 2[P]+O(n)[M] na-sID O-GDDHE No
[53] 2|G1| + ρ |G2| 2[P]+O(n)[M] aID GGM Yes
Ours 2|GN | + ρ |GN | 2[P]+O(n)[M] sID Static No
Table 1. Comparison among compact IBBE (with short ciphertexts and secret keys). Here, n is the maximum number
of recipients.
FIBE |CT| |SKid| #dec Security Assumption
[37] 2|G1| + ρ n|G1| + n|G2| 2[P] +O(τ2 + n)[M] sID aMSE-DDH
[6],[4] 2|G1| + ρ (n2 + n)|G2| 2[P] +O(nτ)[M] sID DBDHE
[22] 2|GN | + ρ (n2 + n)|GN | 2[P] +O(nτ)[M] saID Static
[57] 17|G1| + ρ (6n2 + 5)|G2| 17[P] +O(nτ)[M] saID DLIN
[7] 6|G1| + ρ (n2 + 2n+ 3)|G2| 6[P] +O(nτ)[M] aID Static
Ours 2|GN | + ρ 2n|GN | 2[P] +O(τ2 + n)[M] sID Static
Table 2. Comparison among compact FIBE. Here n is the (maximum) size of attribute set and τ is the threshold.
8 The parameters provided here are only based on the claims made in [27]. It is claimed that there are two possible
ways to remove the random oracles – one is to randomise the keys and the other is to use an oracle variant of
GDDHE, without a proof for the latter. Furthermore, it is not clear how the construction obtained by randomising
the keys (similar to the IBE of [9]) really works, since the ciphertexts in the broadcast setting are structurally
different from those of the IBE.
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Although composite order groups are known to have less efficient implementations than prime
order bilinear groups, we feel that using the former for our constructions is justified. There is a clear
asymptotic efficiency benefit over existing constructions (e.g., [15]) achieving comparable security
guarantees. In both schemes, the number of pairing evaluations is constant. Indeed, a product of two
pairings (which is significantly faster to compute than two independent pairings) suffices to decrypt
whereas the encryption algorithm does not require any pairing evaluation at all. In the FIBE case,
we go from quadratic to linear key sizes in the maximal number of attributes per ciphertext when
we compare it to, e.g., [6]. In the IBBE case, we get constant-size ciphertexts and keys for the first
time under constant-size assumptions.
When the underlying assumptions are taken into account, the benefit of composite order groups
becomes even clearer as we only rely on well-established assumptions whereas the prime order
variants [27, 37] of our schemes require completely ad hoc assumptions that are not even easy
to memorise. We believe the longer the description of an assumption is, the more it looks like
another way to state that the scheme is insecure. The following statement from [39] (p25) buttresses
our belief: “...there is a general preference for assumptions that are simpler to state, since such
assumptions are easier to study and to refute.”.
We further remark that the security loss of both our schemes is proportional to the maximum
size of the sets associated with ciphertexts or than the number of key extraction queries, whichever
is higher. Furthermore we emphasize that a reduction to a standard assumption with some security
loss is more reasonable than a tight reduction to an ad-hoc parameterized assumption since the
actual strength of a parameterized assumption is typically questionable [25].
B Deferred Proofs for the IBBE System
Proofs of Lemmas
Proof (of Lemma 1). The reduction B1 receives an instance (Gpub, g1, g3, T ) of DS1 and simulates
the sid-cpa game to A as follows.
Setup. The adversary A commits to the challenge identity set S∗ = {id∗1, . . . , id∗`∗}. Algorithm B1
samples α, γ̃
R←− ZN and sets γ = γ̃ · pS∗(α). It sets g = g1, chooses u
R←− Gp1 and further
computes Gi = g
αi Ui = u
αi · R3,i for i ∈ [n]. Sampling from Gp1 and Gp3 is done using g1
and g3, respectively. B1 chooses H : GT → {0, 1}ρ, a universal hash function and provides the
following public parameters to A .
PP = (Gpub, g, gγ , (Gi = gα
i
, Ui = u
αi ·R3,i)ni=1, e(g, u)γ , H).
Key Extraction Phase. Upon a key extraction query on idy, B1 picks X3,y





In the challenge phase, A provides two messages M0,M1 ∈ {0, 1}ρ.
Challenge. The reduction algorithm picks a random bit β
R←− {0, 1} and sets C∗1 = T , C∗2 =
(C∗1 )
1/γ̃ and C∗0 = Mβ ⊕ H(e(C∗1 , U0)); sends CT∗ = (C∗0 , C∗1 , C∗2 ) to A .
Guess. At the end of the game, A returns its guess β′ and B1 returns 1 if and only if β = β′.
Observe that the distribution of CT∗ is as in game G2 if T ∈ Gp1 and identical to G3 if T ∈ Gp1p2 .
This readily proves the lemma. ut
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Proof (of Lemma 2). On input an instance (Gpub, g1, g3, h12, h23, T ) of DS2 problem, the reduction
B2 simulates the sid-cpa game as follows.
Setup. Once A commits to the identity set S∗ = {id∗1, . . . , id∗`∗}, B2 chooses α, γ̃
R←− ZN , sets
γ = γ̃ ·pS∗(α), g = g1 and computes Gi = gα
i















3,i ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , n},
where R′3,i
R←− Gp3 . It provides the adversary with public parameters
PP = (Gpub, g, gγ , (Gi = gα
i
, Ui = u
αi ·R3,i)ni=1, e(g, u)γ , H),
where e(g, u)γ is computed as e(g, U0)
γ , which has the proper distribution.












R←− Gp3 . Writing h23 = gt2 · h3 with t ∈ Z∗p2 and h3 ∈ Gp3 , we have rj = tr
′
j mod p2


















have the correct distribution in Gp3 .
Challenge. In the challenge phase, A provides two messages M0,M1 ∈ {0, 1}ρ. At this point, B2
picks β
R←− {0, 1}n, computes challenge ciphertext as





1/γ̃ , C∗0 = Mβ ⊕ H(e(C∗1 , U0))




2 ) to A .
Guess. A guesses β′ ∈ {0, 1} of β and B2 returns 1 if and only if β = β′.
The distribution of CT∗ is identical to that in game G4.(k−1).1 if T ∈ Gp1p3 and as in G4.k.0 if
T ∈ Gp1p2p3 . This immediately proves the lemma. ut













where B is the (q + n+ 1)× (q + n+ 1) matrix given by
B =

1 1 · · · 1
α1 α2 · · · αq+n+1
α21 α
2

































+ q(q + n+ 1)− q = n(n+ 1)
2
+ q(q + n).
We note that det B vanishes if
– αi = αj for some i, j ∈ [q + n+ 1] and columns i, j become identical.
– rows i, j (for some i, j ∈ [n+ 2, q+ n+ 1]) become equal which happens when idi = idj mod p2.





1≤i<k≤q+n+1(αi − αk). We have
degQ = q(q − 1)
2
+





+ q(q + n)
which happens to be equal to degP. Therefore, P must be a constant multiple of Q from which
the statement of the lemma follows. ut
C Description of Aggregate algorithm
We describe the detail of Aggregate algorithm: Define Λ0,η = u
1/(α+xη) for each η ∈ [n] and observe






(α+xi) with 1 ≤ j < η ≤ n,






As long as the distinct scalars x1, . . . , xn satisfy the condition (2), relation (3) allows sequentially




D Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We prove the theorem via a game sequence. As usual we let E denote the event that A
wins in G. Furthermore, we let (1) (S
∗ = (id∗1, . . . , id
∗
`∗), τ
∗) be the challenge set and challenge
threshold; (2) (M0,M1) be the challenge message pair; (3) S1, . . . , Sq denote the sets provided in
extract queries. We define ` = max{|S1|, . . . , |Sq|} and describe the game sequence as follows.
Gr: This is the real security game.
G0: This game is like Gr with the following modifications regarding the identities belonging to the
set S = S1∪· · ·∪Sq: (1) No two distinct identities id 6= id′ mod N in S satisfy id ≡ id′ mod p2;
(2) No identity id ∈ S satisfies α+ id ≡ 0 mod p1. By the argument in Section 3.3, we have




G1: This game is identical to G0 except that, in the initialisation phase, we pick γ̃
R←− ZN and
define γ = γ̃ · pS∗,τ∗(α) mod N . This change is conceptual and Pr[E0] = Pr[E1]. We note that
γ can be explicitly computed. The master public key is
PP =
(




























, K0,y = uy · u0 ·X3,0,y,
where uy
R←− Gp1 and X3,1,y, . . . , X3,`y ,y, X ′3,1,y, . . . , X ′3,n−1,y, X3,0,y
R←− Gp3 ; the challenge
ciphertext is
C0 = Mβ ⊕ H(e(g, u0)sγ̃·pS∗,τ∗ (α)), C1 = gsγ̃·pS∗,τ∗ (α), C2 = gs·pS∗,τ∗ (α).
where β
R←− {0, 1} and s R←− ZN .
G2: In this game, the public parameters are
PP =
(












where U0 = u0 ·X3.0 with X3,0
R←− Gp3 ; the challenge ciphertext is generated as follows
C∗1
R←− Gp1 , C∗2 = C∗1
1/γ̃ , C∗0 = Mβ ⊕ H(e(C∗1 , U0)),
















K0,y = uy · U0 ·X3,0,y
Since e(g, U0) = e(g, u0), we do not change the distribution of the public parameters. Following
the reasoning in Section 3.3, we know that the modification here won’t change the distribution
of the challenge ciphertext. The change on K0,y will not change its distribution either due to
the fresh randomness X3,0,y in each key. Thus, we have Pr[E1] = Pr[E2].
G3: This game is identical to G2 except that the challenge ciphertext is created by first sampling
C∗1
R←− Gp1p2 rather than C∗1
R←− Gp1 and computing C∗2 and C∗0 as in G2. As in Section 3.3,
we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4. There is a PPT algorithm B1 such that
|Pr[E2]− Pr[E3]| ≤ AdvB1G,DS1(λ).
G4: We change the distribution of secret keys SKS1 , . . . ,SKSq by gradually introducing Gp2 com-
ponents. To do so, we need the help of two sub-games G4.k.0, G4.k.1 defined as follows. Recall
that ` = max{|S1|, . . . , |Sq|} which ensures that each secret key has adequate randomness in
Gp2 for the future argument. As before, we define G4.0.1 = G3 and G4.`+n.1 = G4.
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2 · U0 ·X3,0,y,
where g2
R←− Gp2 is a generator of Gp2 and r1,y, . . . , rk,y
R←− ZN are fresh for each secret
key. However we note that α1, . . . , αk−1
R←− ZN are shared among all secret keys. For the
other case (i.e., k > `y + n), the secret key is defined as in G4.k−1.1.






























K0,y = uy · g
∑ky
j=1 rj,y
2 · U0 ·X3,0,y,
where ky = min{k, `y + n}, α, α1, . . . , αk
R←− ZN are shared among all secret keys and
r1,y, . . . , rky ,y
R←− ZN are fresh for each secret key.
By a similar argument in Section 3.3, we know that α mod p2 is only leaked from
SKS1 , . . . ,SKSq in G4.k.0 and the CRT thus implies Pr[E4.k.0] = Pr[E4.k.1] for all k. We also
have the following lemma for all k ∈ [`+ n].
Lemma 5. There exists a PPT algorithm B2 such that
|Pr[E4.(k−1).1]− Pr[E4.k.0]| ≤ AdvB2G,DS2(λ).
G5: We replace the exponents in the Gp2-components of SKSy (y ∈ [q]) with independent random
elements t0,y, t
′
1,y . . . , t
′
n−1,y, t1,y, . . . , t`y ,y ∈ ZN . In particular, a private key SKSy for Sy (y ∈






















K0,y = uy · g
t0,y
2 · U0 ·X3,0,y
We are going to prove that G5 and G4 are statistically indistinguishable. For y ∈ [q],




1,y, . . . , t̂
′
n−1,y, t̂1,y, . . . , t̂`y ,y. With the notations
By =

1 1 · · · 1
α1 α2 · · · α`y+n
α21 α
2























· · · γ̃pS∗,τ∗ (α`y+n)α`y+n+id`y,y

and
ry = (r1,y, . . . , r`y+n,y)
> ∈ Z`y+nN ,
t̂y = (t̂0,y, t̂
′
1,y, . . . , t̂
′
n−1,y, t̂1,y, . . . , t̂`y ,y)





















The special structure of matrix A and the following lemma imply that all t̂y are uniform over
Z`y+np2 with probability 1− q(`+ 2n)2/p2 and thus |Pr[E4]− Pr[E5]| ≤ q(`+ 2n)2/p2.
Lemma 6. The matrices B1, . . . ,Bq are all invertible with overwhelming probability 1−q(`+
2n)2/p2.
Compare with the matrix A in Equation (1), the matrices B1, . . . ,Bq here are more com-
plicated in the sense that, for each y ∈ [q], there can be an id ∈ Sy such that
γ̃pS∗,τ∗ (x)
x+id is a
polynomial in x, i.e., id ∈ S∗. We can prove that when the number of such identities does
not reach τ∗ for each y ∈ [q], all matrices B1, . . . ,Bq are still invertible with overwhelming
probability.
G6: In this game, we change the distribution of U0 as follows.
U0 = u0 ·X3.0 −→ U0 = u0 · gt02 ·X3.0.
where t0
R←− ZN . This changes the distributions of both secret keys and challenge ciphertext.
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 7. There exists a PPT algorithm B2 such that we have the inequality |Pr[E5] −
Pr[E6]| ≤ AdvB2G,DS2(λ).
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G7: In this game, the challenge ciphertext is generated as
C∗1
R←− Gp1p2 , C∗2 = C∗1
1/γ̃ , C∗0 = Mβ ⊕K
where K
R←− {0, 1}ρ. In order to prove that G6 and G7 are statistically close, we only need to
check the following terms in G6:
C∗0 = H(e(C
∗
1 , U0)) = H(e(g
s·γ , u0) · e(gω22 , g
t0
2 ) )
K0,1 = u1 · u0 · g
t0,1+t0
2 ·X3,0,1, . . . , K0,q = uq · u0 · g
t0,q+t0
2 ·X3,0,q
for some ω2 ∈ ZN . We emphasize that t0 and t0,1, . . . , t0,q only appear in the above terms
(labelled by the boxes) and {t0, t0,1 + t0, . . . , t0,q + t0} are uniformly distributed over Zq+1p2 .
This means that, conditioned on A ’s view, e(C∗1 , U0) still has log(p2) bits of min-entropy
when C∗1 has a non-trivial Gp2 component (i.e., ω2 6= 0 mod p2). Therefore we can conclude
as in Section 3.3 that |Pr[E6]− Pr[E7]| ≤ 1/p2 + 1/2λ.
It is not hard to observe that the challenge ciphertext reveals nothing about β ∈ {0, 1} in G7. Thus
we have Pr[E7] = 1/2. Combining all the above together, we may prove the theorem.
Proofs of Lemmas
Proof (of Lemma 4). The reduction B1 receives an instance (Gpub, g1, g3, T ) of DS1 and simulates
the sid-cpa game to A as follows.
Setup. Received the challenge set S∗ and threshold τ∗ from A , algorithm B1 samples α, γ̃
R←− ZN
and computes γ = γ̃ · pS∗,τ∗(α). It sets g = g1, picks u0
R←− Gp1 (taking g1 as a generator) and
computes Gi = g
αi for i ∈ [2n− 1]. B1 chooses H : GT → {0, 1}ρ, prepares U0 = u0 ·X3.0 where
X3,0
R←− Gp3 and returns the following public parameters to A .(











where d1, . . . , dn−1 ∈ ZN are selected arbitrarily.
Key Extraction Phase. Upon a key extraction query on Sy of size `y, the reduction B1 picks
uy
R←− Gp1 (using g = g1 as the generator), X3,1,y, . . . , X3,`y ,y, X ′3,1,y, . . . , X ′3,n−1,y, X3,0,y
R←−














, K0,y = uy · U0 ·X3,0,y,
because both α and γ are known to B1.
Challenge. The reduction algorithm receives two messages M0,M1 ∈ {0, 1}ρ, it picks a random
bit β
R←− {0, 1} and returns CT∗ = (C∗0 , C∗1 , C∗2 ) where





1/γ̃ , C∗0 = Mβ ⊕ H(e(C∗1 , U0)).
Guess. Finally, A returns its guess β′ and B1 returns 1 if and only if β = β′.
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Observe that the distribution of CT∗ is as in game G2 if T ∈ Gp1 and identical to G3 if T ∈ Gp1p2 .
This proves the lemma. ut
Proof (of Lemma 5). On input an instance (Gpub, g1, g3, h12, h23, T ) of DS2 problem, the reduction
B2 simulates the sid-cpa game as follows.
Setup. A commits to the challenge set S∗ and the challenge threshold τ∗. B2 chooses α, γ̃
R←− ZN
and compute γ = γ̃ ·pS∗,τ∗(α). By setting g = g1, B2 can compute Gi = gα
i
for each i ∈ [2n−1].
It sets U0 = u0 ·X3.0 where u0
R←− Gp1 and X3,0
R←− Gp3 and returns the public parameters(











where d1, . . . , dn−1 ∈ ZN are dummy identities and H is a universal hash function as required.
B2 also choose α1, . . . , αk−1
R←− ZN .
Key Extraction Phase. When receiving the y-th query Sy ⊆ I of size `y, B2 considers two cases:
– if k ≤ `y + n, B2 picks µy, r̃1,y, . . . , r̃k−1,y
R←− ZN and X̃3,1,y, . . . , X̃3,`y ,y,
X̃ ′3,1,y, . . . , X̃
′
3,n−1,y, X̃3,0,y



























j=1 r̃j,y · U0 · X̃3,0,y,
– if k > `y + n, B2 picks uy
R←− Gp1 using g1 as the generator, r̃1,y, . . . , r̃`y+n,y
R←− ZN and
X̃3,1,y, . . . , X̃3,`y ,y, X̃
′
3,1,y, . . . , X̃
′
3,n−1,y, X̃3,0,y

























K0,y = uy · (h2h3)
∑`y+n
j=1 r̃j,y · U0 · X̃3,0,y,
Challenge. In the challenge phase, A chooses two messages M0,M1 ∈ {0, 1}ρ. The reduction B2
picks β
R←− {0, 1}n and returns the challenge ciphertext





1/γ̃ , C∗0 = Mβ ⊕ H(e(C∗1 , U0)).
Guess. When A has its guess β′, B2 returns 1 if and only if β = β′.
Let g2 ∈ Gp2 be a generator of Gp2 , we can write h2h3 = g
ω2




2 · T3 where
ω2, ω1,
R←− ZN , ω∗2 is either a random element in ZN or equals 0, and h3, T3 are uniformly distributed
over Gp3 . In the key extraction phase, the simulation for the second case is correct where B2
implicitly sets
r1,y = ω2 · r̃1,y, . . . , r`y+n,y = ω2 · r̃`y+n,y
for Sy; for the first case, B2 implicitly sets
uy = g
ω1µy




Note that uy only reveals µy mod p1. Therefore when ω
∗
2 6= 0 (i.e., T ∈ Gp1p2p3), rk,y is uniformly
distributed over ZN and the simulation is identical to G4.k.0; otherwise, when ω∗2 = 0 (i.e., T ∈
Gp1p3), we have rk,y = 0 and the simulation is as G4.(k−1).1. This readily proves the lemma. ut
Proof (of Lemma 6). For convenience, we discard the subscript y ∈ [q]. We note that our analysis
can be applied to all B1, . . . ,Bq. Let (S
∗ = (id∗1, . . . , id
∗
`∗), τ
∗) be the challenge set and threshold
while S = (id1, . . . , id`) be the set associated with the key we are looking at. According to the




1, . . . , idτ = id
∗
τ
(In fact this can be achieved via re-ordering.) We define the polynomials
p−i(x) = pS∗,τ∗(x)/(x+ idi) for all i ∈ [τ ].




1 1 · · · · · · 1
α1 α2 · · · · · · α`+n
α21 α
2







2 · · · · · · α
n−1
`+n
























i∈[τ+1,`](x+ idi) and q−i(x) = q(x)/(x+ idi) for all j ∈ [τ + 1, `].
We may equivalently study the following matrix, denoted by B̂, which is obtained from B by
multiplying the j-th column by q(αj) for j ∈ [`+ n] and multiplying each of the last `− τ rows by
1/γ̃. 
q(α1) q(α2) · · · · · · q(α`+n)
α1q(α1) α2q(α2) · · · · · · α`q(α`+n)
α21q(α1) α
2







2 q(α2) · · · · · · α
n−1
` q(α`+n)




p−τ (α1)q(α1) p−τ (α2)q(α2) · · · · · · p−τ (α`+n)q(α`+n)








Following the idea of Chase and Meiklejohn [23], it is sufficient to argue the following polynomials
(in x) are linearly independent.
q(x), xq(x), . . . , xn−1q(x), p−1(x)q(x), . . . , p−τ (x)q(x),
pS∗,τ∗(x)q−(τ+1)(x), . . . , pS∗,τ∗(x)q−`(x).
(4)













is a zero polynomial. We prove that all these coefficients are zero in two steps.
Step 1. For all i ∈ [τ + 1, `], we have
C(−idi) = cip(−idi)q−i(−idi) = 0,
because −idi is a common root of q(x) and q−j(x) with j 6= i. Since −idi is not a root of p(x) and
q−i(x), we can deduce that ci = 0.
Step 2. It remains to show that all ai and bi are zero. We should prove that
1, x, . . . , xn−1, p−1(x), . . . , p−τ (x) (5)
are linearly independent. To this end, let us take a closer look at the polynomials p−i(x) with









(x+ id∗j ) ·
∏
i∈[n+τ∗−1−`∗]
(x+ di)︸ ︷︷ ︸
p̃(x)
.
We rely on two observations: (1) p̃(x) divides all p−i(x) and deg(p̃) = n + τ
∗ − 1 − τ ≥ n; (2)
p̂−1(x), . . . , p̂−τ (x) are linearly independent polynomials of degree τ − 1. The second observation
means p̂−1(x), . . . , p̂−τ (x) form a basis of all polynomial of degree at most τ − 1. This means that
proving the independence of (5) is equivalent to proving the independence of
1, x, . . . , xn−1, p̃(x), xp̃(x), . . . , xτ−1p̃(x) (6)
because 1, x, x2, . . . , xτ−1 also form a basis of the linear space of all polynomials of degree ≤ τ − 1.
From the first observation, we can see that
deg(p̃(x)) = n+ ε, deg(xp̃(x)) = n+ 1 + ε, . . . , deg(xτ−1p̃(x)) = n+ τ − 1 + ε
for some non-negative integer ε. This immediately derives that the `+ n polynomials in Eq.(6) are
linearly independent and so are the polynomials in Eq.(5).
Combining this two steps, we prove that polynomials in Eq.(4) are linearly independent. Since
det(B̂) is a polynomial in α1, . . . , α`+n of degree at most (` + 2n)
2, the Schwartz-Zippel implies
det(B̂) = 0 with the probability bounded by (`+ 2n)2/p2 and so does the event det(B) = 0 when
sampling α1, . . . , α`+n
R←− Zp2 . By the union bound, we immediately prove the lemma. ut
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Proof (of Lemma 7). On input an instance (Gpub, g1, g3, h12, h23, T ) of DS2 problem, the reduction
B2 simulates the sid-cpa game as follows.
Setup. A commits to the challenge set S∗ and the challenge threshold τ∗. B2 chooses α, γ̃
R←− ZN
and compute γ = γ̃ ·pS∗,τ∗(α). By setting g = g1, B2 can compute Gi = gα
i
for each i ∈ [2n−1].
B2 defines U0 = T and returns the public parameters(











where d1, . . . , dn−1 ∈ ZN are dummy identities and H is a universal hash function as required.
Key Extraction Phase. When receiving the y-th query Sy ⊆ I of size `y, B2 sam-
ples uy
R←− Gp1 (using g = g1), t̃0,y, t̃′1,y . . . , t̃′n−1,y, t̃1,y, . . . , t̃`y ,y ∈ ZN and
X̃3,0,y, X̃
′
3,1,y, . . . , X̃
′
3,n−1,y, X̃3,1,y, . . . , X̃3,`y ,y










K ′i,y = u
αi
y · (h2h3)




K0,y = uy · (h2h3)t̃0,y · U0 · X̃3,0,y.
Challenge. In the challenge phase, A chooses two messages M0,M1 ∈ {0, 1}ρ. The reduction B2
picks β
R←− {0, 1}n and returns the challenge ciphertext





1/γ̃ , C∗0 = Mβ ⊕ H(e(C∗1 , U0)).
Guess. When A has its guess β′, B2 returns 1 if and only if β = β′.
As before we can write h2h3 = g
ω2




2 · T3 where g2 ∈ Gp2 is a generator of
Gp2 , ω2, ω1,
R←− ZN , ω∗2 is either a random element in ZN or equals 0, and h3, T3 are uniformly
distributed over Gp3 . In the key extraction phase, B2 implicitly sets
t0,y = ω2 · t̃0,y, t′1,y = ω2 · t̃′1,y, . . . , t′n−1,y = ω2 · t̃′n−1,y,
t1,y = ω2 · t̃1,y, . . . , t`y ,y = ω2 · t̃`y ,y.




2 6= 0 (i.e., T ∈ Gp1p2p3), the simulation is identical to
G6; otherwise, when ω
∗
2 = 0 (i.e., T ∈ Gp1p3), the simulation is as G5. This proves the lemma. ut
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